SUMMARY. The coming to terms with the communist past was a major challenge in the countries of the Eastern Bloc following the demise of communism 1989/90. The Czech Republic was hereby no exception. The article aims to describe the relation between the use of anti-communism and the failure of coming to terms with the communist past. The focus lies on the description of the gradual decline of anti-communism, with the description of parallel cleavages and divisions in the Czech society, catalysing the turn of events. The main thesis of the paper is that anti-communism in the Czech Republic had failed with the situation unlikely to change in the near future.

KEYWORDS: Czech Republic, political transformation, post-communism, sociopolitical cleavages, historical narratives, political crisis.

The transition of Central and East European states from communist regimes to democracy is a unique historical process. The societies in the region were faced by many challenges, including the introduction of market-economy and establishment of democratic institutions, with adequate participation and backing of the population. A peculiar challenge was the reprocessing of the own, communist past. This paper’s aim is to describe the sociopolitical development in the Czech Republic with regard to the coming to terms with the previous communist regimes. The article hereby focuses on the use of anti-communism in political discourse, stipulating that its frequent and utilitarian use has led to the demise of anti-communism itself and to the failure of reprocessing the communist history of the country.

SETTING THE PATH FOR COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST: THE CZECH TRANSITION 1989

The transition of Czechoslovakia from a socialist, authoritarian regime to democracy, which began in November 1989, is generally categorised as a regime col-
lapse\(^1\), with the communist leadership gradually losing control of the situation and the state apparatus, resulting in handing over the power to a distinct group of dissidents\(^2\), the leading figure being Václav Havel. While the systematic categorisation distinguishes the Czechoslovak regime collapse from negotiated transitions in Poland and Hungary, features of negotiation and participation of communist elites in the transition process in Czechoslovakia should not be omitted.

The person of Marián Čalfa can serve as the best example. This seasoned, mid-scale communist politician had replaced Prime Minister Adamec in the tumultuous days of November 1989, before presiding over a second cabinet, made up of communists and non-communists, which became known as the “government of national understanding [Vláda národního porozumění]”. This led the country to the first free elections, which took place in June 1990. The outcome of the elections, an overwhelming victory of the Civic Forum, resulted in a further term of office for Čalfa, who remained federal Prime Minister until 1992. Controversial and debated until today remains the role of Čalfa in clearing the way for the election of Václav Havel as the president of Czechoslovakia, the focus here being the persuasion of communist deputies to elect Havel. While the parting communist regime preferred a direct, popular vote, this proved problematic, as at that time, Havel was virtually unknown to the public and it was highly probable, that he could lose the vote to Alexander Dubček, the legendary – if not uncontroversial in his own right – face of the Prague Spring 1968. It was mainly due to the lobbying of Čalfa among communist deputies that not only the election of the new president remained the task of the Federal Assembly\(^3\), but it was Havel, who was at last elected, securing his rise to power and political influence in Czechoslovakia and later in the Czech Republic.\(^4\) It is not an effort of this article to challenge the general categorisations of Czechoslovak transition, however, communist elites did play a significant role in the change of power and in the establishment of new elites in Czechoslovakia. While the collapse of communist power was inevitable, and


\(^2\) Wolfgang Merkel, *Systemtransformation – Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung* (Frankfurt am Main, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010).


\(^4\) The events surrounding the election of Havel and generally the transitional period of 1989/1990 as a whole are still subject to historiographical controversies, not to mention the countless conspiracy theories and speculations.
thus the collapse categorisation does have its validity, parts of the communist elites secured their position in the upcoming political and economic transformation.  

Three major assertions can be drawn from the initial stages of the Czech transformation and subsequently used as an analytical template. The first is the marginal prosecution of communist crimes and their culprits and, in general, rather diminutive exploits in the field of transitional justice following shortly after the events of 1989 and early 1990, which set the path for democracy. The second assertion is the commencing fragmentation within the post-communistic Czech political elites. This vital centre-point was a bias and alienation towards Václav Havel and his political concepts as well as his political attitude and aptitude. The third assertion refers to the general perception of the 1989 events and their entry into the general narratives. The epitome “Velvet revolution” represents not only a moderate, bloodless transition, it also serves as a distinction of Czech national traits. One of its major roles was to stipulate a general ability of the Czechs to resolve the conflict peacefully and in a civilised manner. As it will be demonstrated later in the article, these self-perceptions and ascriptions of national traits can be easily contested and repudiated. Moreover, the acceptance of this bold and noble label is also a useful instrument of reluctance towards an intrinsic and vast coming to terms with the communist past. As such, the “velvet” label of the events of 1989/90 has to be distinguished from the perception of the transformation and its acceptance among the Czech public. The acceptance, which soon after 1989 had to face the dynamic changes, which in return themselves prompted a further shift from a major re-processing of the communist past in the Czech Republic.

THE CZECH SOCIETY AND THE TRANSITIONAL DIVIDE

The Czech society has managed to proceed from communism to democracy in a relatively calm manner. However, establishing democracy and makret-economy is not a process for a short-period, just as Rome was not build in a day. Moreover, two dimensions have to be clearly distinguished in the attempt to analyse and portray this process. On the one hand, there is the establishment and foundation of institutions, institutional and legal frameworks, which comprise the fundament of the transition. On the other hand, there is the introduction of the new reality into


the consciousness of the society, the active, cognitive participation of the people, mainly regarding the democratic and economic standards, as well as the images of the communist past and the coming to terms with it. Both of these dimensions were subject to shortcomings with a subsequent aggravating effect.

The emergence and crystallisation of a new party array was a prominent process in the first half of the nineties, with some parties emerging on the foundations of the Civic Forum (the Civic Democratic Party – ODS), some renewing their activities after a period of prohibition (the Czech Social Democrats), others returning back to their roots from the indoctrination within the Popular front (the Christian Democrats – The People’s Party / KDU-CSL) and some being newly established. At the same time, the Czech political scene saw the profilation of leading political personalities, the most shining example being Václav Havel, the president of the Czech Republic, and Václav Klaus, the founding father of the ODS and spiritus agens of the Czech economic transformation. This profilation soon evolved into political antagonism and rivalry of these two politicians, mainly centered about the political and economical conceptualisation of the Czech transitional pathway. However, alongside the personal rivalry and political competition of the two prominent Václavs, a cleavage had emerged, which became a lasting burden and impact on the Czech political culture up to the present day and which was in many ways peculiar.

The main objection against Havel was the repudiation of his “non-political politics” by his political opponents, which were often – but not exclusively – the followers of Klaus. Moreover, Havel’s policy was deemed elitary and distant from the people, while the opponents often labelled themselves as those, who are prone for the real interests of the people, the polity and economy, only to disguise their excessive power mongering. This ideological cleavage saw the introduction of labels, which are since then present in the Czech political discourse, addressing the followers of Havel or those, who are alleged to be such, as “Havloids”, “pravdoláskař” and “the Prague Café”. The mentioned peculiarity of this cleavage consists of two notable traits. The first is the absence of counterparts of the callous and derogative labels, which would be used to generally denominate the “others”. In political discourse, there is no specific discoursive strategy and lexicology used by the alleged “Havloids”, when reffering to those, who label them as such. The second,

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9 While the term “Havloid” speaks for it self, the term “pravdoláskař” is virtually non-translatable, it is derived from the famous Havel’s quote “Truth and Love shall prevail over lie and hatred”, with “truthlover” being a close translation of this peculiar term. “Prague Café” intends to stress the elitary and distant position of Havel’s followers from social and political reality.
and more impacting peculiar trait is, that the usage of the mentioned terms crosses ideological and political boundaries and can be found among liberals, conservatives, communists and social democrats. The high number of great coalitions and mesalliances on regional and municipal level as well as the countless cases of corruption and power abuse, serve as evidence of a “transideological” attitude towards assuming of political power, breaching the boundaries of ideology and political programmes.10

Due to the lack of a proper legal framework, legislative and institutional backing, the coupon privatisation and economic transformation in general saw many cases of defraudsations and economic criminality. The process saw the introduction of a new term – “tunneling” – stipulating the fact that many privatised assets were fraudulently disassembled, their valuable substance diverted to private accounts, leaving behind a soon-to-be bankrupt rest and unemployed staff. Such development severely tarnished the attitude of the society towards the economic transition and saw an increase in mistrust towards the ruling political elites. The institutional and legal framework as well as the perception on behalf of the population and the people’s conduct suffered from severe shortcomings in relation to the aims of transition on its way to democracy and standard market-economy.

Neither of the political concepts represented by Klaus and Havel managed to get embedded in the Czech society on a massive basis, despite the discursive presence of their followers, which points out the shortcomings of the transitional process.11 With reference to the state of democracy, the transition and the Czech political elites and the situation in the Czech Republic in the period portrayed can be best described by using the model of Higley and Lengyel.12 According to the model, a proper category to describe the Czech Republic’s politics and its elites is the one of “fragmented elites”, especially due to the prevalent factor of a “weak or no shared ethos”, “reciprocal distrust and suspicion” and “dense but segmented network”, which altogether describes the Czech Republic’s regime as an unconsolidated democracy.13

In this fragmentation, anti-communism had played a crucial role, as it was used as a major distinction between the political fractions, a tool to highlight the genuinity

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10 It is necessary to point out that this shall not suggest, that the division between “Havloids” and the “others” is congruent with a divide between “saints” and “villains” as that would simplify the matter too much. Generally, this division and labeling within Czech politics remains a desideratum of political sciences regionally focused on the Czech Republic.

11 James F. Pontuso, 171-172.


13 Higley, Lengyel, 7.
and nobility and to belittle the political opponent.\textsuperscript{14} Anti-communism and the coming to terms with the communist past was thus instrumental and utilitarian, rather than founded on a general popular consensus and lacking an elite consensus right away. Added to that, the mishaps of the economic transition, the widespread corruption and power abuse shifted the focus of the population from the communist past to the transitional presence, often fueled by nostalgia, resulting from selective memory of the social security before 1989. The rise of anti-communism in this era was also the beginning of its decline.

THE RISE AND FALL OF ANTI-COMMUNISM

The emergence of anti-communism is mainly linked to the emerging ideological divides in the Czech politics, which had emerged ever since it became evident that the Civic Forum as a platform cannot serve and fulfill the needs of the post-communist political scene and array. In this scope, anti-communism served as a way in which the growing number of dissatisfied activists within the Civic Forum was able to control the fragmentation into emerging political parties\textsuperscript{15}. This was understood as the basic instrument of power, and such profilation thus provided a distinct trait for crystallisation.

One major instrument of the profilation, which was aiming to provide a distinct anti-communist instrument in shaping the post-communist society, was the so called lustrations, introduced by the Federal law in Czechoslovakia, in 1991.\textsuperscript{16} After the dismemberment of the Czechoslovak Federation, it was the Czech Republic were the Lustration laws were strictly enforced, even with a prolonged period of enforcement and, added to that, the Czech legislation granted the Czech public access to the files of the communist secret police StB. In contrast, in Slovakia has shown little interest for similar processes, the laws’ validity expiring 1996.\textsuperscript{17}

In July 1993, just a few months after the Czecho-Slovak split, the Czech parliament adopted a law with the title “Zákon o protiprávnosti komunistického režimu a odporu proti němu [Law concerning the lawlessness of the Communist regime and opposition]”.\textsuperscript{18}


and the resistance against it”]. Despite its towering-sounding title, the law can only be seen as an act of symbolic condemnation, a fact owed much to its declaratory nature. Only §8, invoking the Government to proper action and remediation of tort, suffered by the victims of the Communist regime, can be seen as having a more vast and actual impact on the society. Indeed, subsequent governments have implemented a number of recompensation measures in the financial and social-security area. Despite this, the law had only little effect on the general narrative of the communist past and the coming to terms with this era. Neither was this the case with the Institute of Documentation and Investigation of the Crimes of Communism (ÚDV). Founded in 1996 as a subdivision of the Ministry of the Interior, the institution was set as an investigative body with the aim of delivering evidence for the prosecution of communist crimes and their culprits. While the efforts of the Institute did provide evidence for many cases of law violations and even led to a certain amount of prosecutions and sentences, their number was scarce. Despite its lack of impact on the historical narrative and the failure to become an agency of a sociopolitical reprocessing of the past, the Institute can still be seen as a notable body, with a low-scale public perception, but far from being tarnished as a tool of anti-communism.

Anti-communism, as a prominent feature of the Czech political campaigning, gained a massive position prior to the parliamentary elections of 1998. The Civic Democratic Party, suffering from the failures of the economic reforms and the subsequent crisis, started to lose electoral acclaim and the surveys marked a rising potential of the left-wing Social Democrats. Shortly before the polls, the ODS represented by the then chairman Václav Klaus, staged the presentation and publication of a call-to-arms-poster. Drawing a parallel between the mobilisation of September 1938, the poster implied a danger of return to the communist regime, a derivation from the pathway of post-1989 and urged the voters to vote for the ODS, at the same time implying that the Social Democrats are about to change the course of political development. Regarding this pathetic call, the outcome of the post-electoral negotiations was surprising and puzzling, if only at the first sight. The so called Opposition treaty divided the power between the ODS and the Social Democracy, securing the latter’s minority government, headed by the Prime Minister Milo Zeman. The step can be seen as not surprising at all, as this power division corresponds with the transideological cleavage, uniting those

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19 The layout and original text of the poster can be found at: <http://i.lidovky.cz/pes/08/093/pnesd/WAG260286_mobilisace.jpg> [retrieved 22.12.2013].
urging for the securing of power and technology of power in general.\textsuperscript{20} This scheme was followed by numerous coalitions in the regional bodies, which were notorious for cases of corruption, nepotism and power abuse. Despite all these steps, which unveiled the utilitarian and mendacious nature of the presented anti-communism, the ODS continued to involve a similar tenor to its electoral programmes.\textsuperscript{21} The liberal-conservative party hereby developed and introduced more sophisticated and outright methods to proliferate the “message” and to tarnish the image of the Social Democrats through allegations of collaboration with Communists and the intended return to previous times. The acronym “KSČSSD”, a composition suggesting a nominal and factual fusion/unity between the Communist and Social Democratic party can serve as a good example, as it became popular in the appropriate discourse against the Social Democrats.

However, the constant use of an alleged threat posed by the ČSSD, despite the fact that the practical evidence and experience with the party refuted such allegations, bore its fruits. As with every inflationary use, anti-communism too began to lose its value, and alongside with the scandals and misconduct of the political elites started to be perceived not only as instrumental, but as outright repugnant.

On the institutional level and with regard to the influence on historical narratives of the communist past and the coming to terms with it, the creation of the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes (ÚSTRA) serves as a shining example of this development. To be established as an Institute of National Memory – parallel to similar institutes in Poland and Slovakia – was the result of a lengthy process. Initiated by the ODS-dominated Senate, the parliamentary debate saw the Social Democrats protest against this initiative, claiming that the intended institution was merely a tool of political dominance over historical narratives for the ODS. After a lengthy process, the Institute was finally established and became part of the Czech legislation.\textsuperscript{22} The fact that the allegations of the Social Democrats were not merely utilitarian was proven by the installment of Pavel Žáček as the Director of the Institute. This has done little to disguise that he shared the political ideas of the ODS and the idea, the Social Democrats are an obstacle for the reprocessing of the Communist past and thus allegations of their affiliation with

\textsuperscript{20} It is not a coincidence, that in the split within the Social Democracy in late 2013, which has its roots in the failed election of Zeman to president in 2003, one fraction addressed the other as “havloids” and “pravdoláskaři”. This happened with the backing of Zeman, who at last succeeded to gain the highest political post in popular vote in 2013.

\textsuperscript{21} The parliamentary programme of 2002, for the elections following the oppositional arrangement between the ODS and the CSSD can serve as an example. Available at: <http://www.ods.cz/docs/programy/program_2002.pdf> [retrieved 22.12.2013].

\textsuperscript{22} Law 181/2007.
the Communist are just. After the ODS had lost its majority in the Senate to the Social Democrats, the latter attempted to adjust the political influence in the Institute. The installment of a director Jiří Pernes resulted in allegations from the ODS, similar to those of the Social Democrats during the founding of the Institute. As of 2013, the situation in the Institute remains problematic, torn between the interests of the parties, rendering the Institute a political tool and an initially anti-communist institution in the public opinion, leaving it with a negative reputation.

Another major blow for the attitude towards anti-communism was the so called “egg-assaults” against the politicians of the Social Democracy, mainly against the then Chairman of the party, Jiří Paroubek, that took place prior to the elections to the European Parliament, in 2009. While primarily aimed against the personality of Paroubek, who was presented as a potential dictator akin to communist rulers, the protest was often associated with the anti-communist accusations against the Social Democrats in general. The dimensions of the assaults and their often intrusive and violent nature led to the accusations of fascism. While in the right-wing discourse communism was and is often equated with fascism/nazism, based on the historical experience and practice of the regimes, anti-communism began to be equated with fascism in left-wing discourses. Anti-communism began to be faced by anti-anti-communism, which emerged as a consequent result of the sociopolitical development in the Czech Republic.

Although this development was logical and justified with regard to the abuse of anti-communism, this turn of events also comprised a blow for any attempts of coming to terms with the communist past. With anti-communist being often labelled as “primitive”, even sincere and needed attempts to present the communist crimes and the urge to prosecute them or at least maintain them as a memento in the Czech national memory now face the same threat of being regarded as primitive and as a mere attempt of utilitarian anti-communism. The re-configuration of the Czech political setup after the elections of 2013 shows little hope for improvement.

THE NATIONAL MEMORY AND THE NATIONAL TRAIT

The main objective of this paper is to depict the malign effect of anti-communism abuse and concomitant socio-political reality on the coming to terms with the

communist past. However, the aforementioned possibility of contesting the peaceful nature of the Czech nation when it comes to conflict resolving should also be discussed. The section shows that this thesis is contestable and only serves as an analytical assumption based on a heuristical perception of the contemporary, present-day discourse on history among the Czech public.

Ladislav Holy’s book *The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation* can be perceived as classical, when it comes to the analysis of the Czech self-ascriptions and their references to history, as well as the Czech national consciousness in general. According to Holy, reference to history are part of everyday political discourse, the Czechs are projecting contemporary ideas and values on the narrative of the past times, which are then used as a legitimation for the present era. The selection of historical topics, their evaluation and subsequent projection are highly selective and are conceived to portray the Czech nation in a positive light; the omission of negative traits and aspects does not only include nationalism, which is deemed as a trait bothering other nations, yet not the Czechs. Historical narratives and their role in present days’ discourses are constructed to suit the needs of politics and society. They are often used as a means of political mobilisation in times of oppression and depression. They highlight glorious times of the nation, the exploits and glorious deeds, whereas the falls and failures are attributed to foreign powers and foreign enemies in general.

Ever since the establishment of the political elites in the Czech nation-building process, the usage of history can be traced in the analysis of the Czech political discourse. The presence of exogenous “enemies”, mainly the Catholic Church, the Germans and the Austrian Empire is notable in this major political discourse. Be it the strengthening national idea, the introduction of the Hus-Cult into the Czech national idea as an opposition to Catholicism, then the major religion among the Czechs or the Czech claim of Bohemia in opposition to the Bohemian Germans, the antagonist notions were always external. By no means were the clashes and conflicts of the Czechs with these antagonists peaceful and calm. The clashes between the Czech and the German students in the late 19th century and the nationalist brawl in this era in general, the assault on the Catholic and sacral objects after the founding of Czechoslovakia in 1918, and last but not least, the events of the

25 Holy, 189.
Second World War, the occupation and subsequent expulsion of the Czechoslovak Germans, the so called Sudetengermans serve as an example of the opposite. Especially the latter event constitutes a series of violent and brutal excesses towards the Sudetengerman civilians, which remains a controversy in the Czech politics and society.

After 1989, the debates about the post-war events became subject to the debates with the German and Austrian governments and in then open society, the Sudetengermans and their organisations became more vocal and demanding. While science, politics and society made a shift from the staunch attitude of the pre-1989 communist propaganda, opening itself for debate and discussion, the general attitude remained firm. The postwar-order and the resulting ethnic homogeneity of Czechoslovakia became sacrosanct in the Czech political discourse, lasting up till today. This included the geopolitical setup, due to the Allies and Soviet Union being the guaranteeing powers of this configuration.28 This attitude and perception of the past, including its implementation into the present discourse is surprising, as the post-war order also meant the succumbing of Czechoslovakia to the communist rule and Soviet domination, hereby exposing some citizens to Stalinist terror, torture and harsh imprisonment in detention camps, as well as a large number of executions. However, unlike the staunch and rigid approval of the expulsion or at least the search for exculpations, the digression to the communist rule and the chain of events leading to February 1948, the communist coup d’état, are not prevalent subjects of political debates. The reduction of the party array to a system of a popular front, the socialisation of key industries, the rise of the Communist party as an influential power, the alignment towards the Soviet Union, were a part of the national, political common sense after 1945, resulting from the disillusions caused by the Second World War and the failure of the Czechoslovak ally system prior to it, not to forget the bleak consequences of the economic crisis on the society, especially, its poorest strata. Thus, it can be argued, that the pathway to communist rule was very much self-imposed by the approval of the Czech society, with resistance being only punctual and from a certain point on doomed for failure, with often fatal consequences for the actors. A shining example is the national euphoria during the Prague Spring 1968 and the fast, subsequent descent into consumerist conformity of the seventies and eighties, in the so called “normalisation”, with dissent being limited to a narrow number of the population.29

29 Jiří Suk, 34.
However, while the objections against the Germans, the Sudetengermans or the Catholic Church remain present in the Czech political discourse and the historical narratives, the coming to terms with the communist past, including the reprocessing of a general, national “guilt” and failure remains absent. The assumption can be made that the willingness of the Czech nation to compromise itself, to admit its own mistakes and failures is low, in contrast to the persistence of external notions of those, who are perceived as “natural” national enemies and historical antagonists. The antigerman topics in the presidential campaign of Milo Zeman in his bid against Karel Schwarzenberg or the anticatholic stance in the restitutiional debate of 2013 serve as vivid examples.

Forgetting is part of the conceptualisation of national memory, as Ernest Renan concluded. In the Czech case, this “forgetting” seems to concern mainly the Czech nation, including the communist past, whereas accusation of others remains a valid and acknowledged part of the Czech political discourse. Alongside with the abuse of anti-communism and its misconception in the Czech politics, this is a key factor for the failure of the coming to terms with the communist past in the Czech Republic.


In 2013, the Czech society and its politics can be characterised as being in a state of a political crisis. The parliamentary elections of October 2013 and their aftermath have demonstrated the persistent fragmentation among the Czechs and their elites, but also a plea to rearrange the current state of affairs. The spectacular electoral gain of the ANO!-movement around the tycoon Andrej Babiš, the entry into parliament of the populist Úsvit31-movement of Tomio Okamura are evidence of a growing mistrust towards the established party, the development, which had hit the ODS most harshly. The long-time hegemony on the right side of the Czech political array dramatically lost its electoral acclaim and has to fear a fall into political oblivion. The same goes for the Social Democrats, who achieved a Pyrrhic victory by gaining the pole position in the votes yet far under the expected margin, thus being forced to enter coalitions with partners not planned prior. The ill-fated intra-party coup against the chairman Sobotka, which was allegedly orchestrated as a result of the growing influence of the president Zeman in the Czech Social Democracy, is likely to weaken the position of this party as a leading power within the political array.

31 Úsvit being the Czech word for dawn.
Furthermore, the coup’s presentation in the media and politics has been portrayed as aimed against the “pravdoláskáři” in the own party, as an attempt to secure power positions, which cross ideological boundaries.

In such a political environment attempts for coming to terms with the communist past are likely to fail. They either fall prey to accusations of anti-communism as a result of an enduring anti-anti-communism or remain marginal within the present-day political turmoil, being perceived as irrelevant. The idea of the late ex-president Havel that postcommunist countries not only need a revolutionary transition from communism to post-communism but also from post-communism itself\(^{32}\), is fully applicable in the Czech Republic. Whether the development in the aftermath of the 2013 elections is part of the revolution from post-communism is yet to be seen. However, it is unlikely that the coming to terms with the communist past will play a decisive role in the processes to come or in the near future generally. Although the failures of sincere reprocessing of the communist past are a contributing factor to the present day issues, the Czech society and its politics will be much busier with the coming to terms with the problematic present and the redrawing of the current political scheme, rather than with the communist past.

Adam Slabý

ANTIkomunizmo baigtis ir jo poveikis taikantis su komunistine praeitimą Čekijos respublikoje


RAKTĄŽODŽIAI: Čekijos Respublika, politinės transformacijos, pokomunizmas, sociopolitiniai sluoksniai, istoriniai naratyvai, politinė krizė.

\(^{32}\) This Havel’s concept is explained in Pehe’s article, Pehe 2013.