SUMMARY. This article investigates the relation between language and cognitive processes in the contemporary Lithuanian historiography. An attempt is made to distinguish the prejudices (using Gadamer’s terminology) or framing structures (Heidegger’s fore-structures) influencing the cognitive processes involved in the translation of noetic acts and memories into communicative acts.

Basing on Bergson’s representation of the relation between conscience, memory and action (in this case intended as history-writing) we investigate how the unity in the national history (the continuity in the history of contemporary political entity) is construed. In the second part of the article, a number of historiographical works are analysed in order to put to test and revise the theoretical premises. Notably, while supposedly time and space are two of the most important framing structures, in Lithuanian historiography dealing with national history space is rather a concept selected and defined by that of time – not a fore-structure. In turn, historical time seems not to be a metaphor of the experienced one – it usually refers to already linguistically formulated concepts. This is evident when scholars renounce every ‘signifier’ directly connected to a ‘signified’ (terms directly referring to language, borders, geographical elements, administrative divisions) preferring already linguistically construed ‘meanings’ (nation, identity, culture) when formulating historical problems. The possibility to frame space in time and time in language permits to construe the unity of national history. The unity in the national history is attained by exploiting the polysemy of certain expressions and figures of speech. Moreover, in order to construe the unity in the national history, scholars tend to exclude the referents even from the definitions of framing structures such as space and time. We conclude that language is informing and shaping historians’ perception much more than time and space. Therefore, language should be considered the main and most evident prejudice operating and defining cognitive processes in historiography.

KEYWORDS: Lithuanian historiography, cognitive processes, memory, historical time, cognitive rhetoric, hermeneutic, national history.

INTRODUCTION

The cause of this study is a research project on national narratives. Considering the debates during a conference related to this project,¹ we had occasion to organize

¹ We are referring to the research project “Central and Eastern European Region: Research of the Construction
some previous reflections on Lithuanian historiography and compose this article. Here, our understanding of the relation between language and knowledge is used to investigate the cognitive processes involved in the narrative construction of the unity in national history.

When technically speaking of narrative, one could safely assert that the reference is to the construction of the linguistic sign, which has been chosen to define, formulate and transmit a signified (meaning) by the means of a signifier. Renouncing de Saussure’s terminology, we could define narrative as the linguistic expression of noetic acts previously formulated by the means of an intellectual activity. This construction is a natural act of the mind, which is essential, first of all, for the process of memorization. Secondly, it is necessary when one decides to transmit this formulated knowledge to others for a variety of reasons such as to inform, convince, teach, educate, react, etc. The cognitive processes which translate perceptions into memory and, successively, into knowledge are particularly evident in the construction of the national past in academic historiography (intended either as a politic of memory, or as a policy of memory). As a matter of fact, the national histories compiled by historians are the expression of conscious and intentional intellectual acts aimed at the abstraction and formulation of knowledge for the construction and dissemination of a durable memory. Contemporary Lithuanian historiography, intended as the manifest sign of this cognitive process, is the field our research is inquiring into.

Specifically, our study tries to define and investigate the relation between perception, memory, and history-writing as a linguistic event. We are building, firstly, upon the notion that memory and history are two related but distinct representations of the past being the latter a conscious selection of the former. Secondly, we are developing the idea, in some respects borrowed from Hans G. Gadamer, that the language of National Narratives and Politics of Memory (1989-2011)” – VP1-3.1- MM-07-K-02-024 – sponsored by the Programme for Human Resources Development for 2007-2013. The conference (organized as part of this project) “The Construction of National Narratives and Politics of Memory in the Central and Eastern European Region after 1989” has been held at VMU on November 28th and 29th, 2013.

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3 See Ferdinand de Saussure, _Corso di linguistica generale_ (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2009).
5 Henri Bergson, _Materia e memoria_ (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2009).
7 For a synthetic, but clear, definition of these expressions and especially for the distinction between “policy of memory” and “politics of memory” see Jurga Jonutytė, _Philosophy of history_ (Vilnius: Aktėja, 2013): 26-27.
is not just an instrument of the thought, but rather its supporting dimension. Precisely, while attempting to understand how conscience – which is a continuous form of knowledge – is translated into language (a discrete one), we will try to demonstrate our thesis; cognitive processes are strongly influenced by the linguistic structures we use to frame the noetic acts of the mind (one’s perceptions of reality), and therefore the linguistic formulation of one's memory is an event occurring during the translation of the conscience into language, it is not the result of the process. In turn, and with specific reference to contemporary historiography, we suggest the idea of the unity (or continuity) of the Lithuanian history is the result of a peculiar linguistic framing of the thought and in certain cases even of a conscious exploitation – performed to formulate, investigate, and narrate the national history – of the language. Concretely, this article illustrates the very frequent use of polysemic signs to create a sort of diachronic continuity of space and time thanks to the linguistic expressions, which encompass both in the composition of political histories.

In order to corroborate our thesis, we have defined several intermediate tasks in our research. Firstly, we intend to retrace Bergson's model of interaction between perception, intellection and memory in order to use it when investigating historiography. Secondly, we will determine the role of language in the steps of those cognitive processes, which occur when trying to formulate a conscious memory, that is, to form knowledge by the means of an activity of the mind. Thirdly, we aim at understanding how these linguistically construed images are used to tell, inform, or educate. Finally, we will verify these theoretical premises investigating the notion of “unity of the Lithuanian history” in a number of contemporary academic researches trying to unearth, in the rhetorical construction of the texts, remains of the cognitive framing structures (Gadamer’s prejudices and Heidegger’s fore-structures).

This twofold organization of our research is mirrored by the twofold partition of the article. The first part is dedicated to a (re)formulation of the relation between conscience, memory and history-writing from a cognitive perspective. This is a necessary step to subsequently develop a method for the investigation of historical narratives capable of exploiting other disciplines’ possibilities (especially cognitive rhetoric’s) and, thus contribute to the ‘unity of human sciences in the discipline of history’. The analysis of a number of texts, conducted in order to make evident the influence of linguistic-cognitive processes in historians’ representation of the past, is the object of the second and third part.

10 See Oscar Betelli, Processi cognitivi (Bologna: CLUEB, 2000).
11 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 347.
Referring specifically to this second part of our research, it is necessary to present and give reason for both the object selected to be investigated, and for the chosen method of analysis itself. It was necessary to choose linguistic signs in which the cognitive processes, from which they were generated, are as much evident as possible. It was, therefore, essential to select written texts composed by authors conscious (to a certain extent) of these processes and interested in transmitting the reader something more than the evident meaning. In other words, we were looking for texts communicating something that transcends the purpose of information, rather aiming at educating the reader to perceive the reality in an ordered and organized manner. Such are the prerogatives of all academic writings, which tell the readers how to set the evident information in a broader cognitive frame providing them with the author’s already developed framing structures (or fore-structures). This preliminary consideration, in conjunction with the chronological limits and research topic defined by the conference and project organizers induced us to investigate specifically academic works dealing with the representation, construction and narration of memory: contemporary Lithuanian historiography. Furthermore, it was necessary to limit the study to historiographical works, which somehow (because of their topic) compel their authors to linguistically formulate conceptions of time – usually considered the most important cognitive structure – in order to investigate the intellectual processes permitting to formulate the idea of time. It seemed natural to select narratives aimed at construing the unity in the Lithuanian history.

Figure 1.

The research method has been defined basing on the postulate that all historical works are, first of all, linguistic-literary compositions, and consequently they should be considered and investigated as rhetorical works being rhetoric the method of text generation. Rhetorical generation is intended, according to the cognitivist definition, as the act of translation between two systems of representation of the world – conscience and language – rather than as the formal construction of a discourse. Accordingly, all the texts analysed in the second part of our article are investigated as rhetorical works adopting the method of hermeneutical text analysis. Hermeneutical text analysis is precisely the procedure inverse to the rhetorical construction of a text and thus is the only procedure able to make evident the processes occurring during the linguistic construction of memory and its transcription.

Understandably, we do not intend hermeneutic as an auxiliary technique for the philology or other disciplines. However, we do not intend hermeneutic as the instrument to reconstruct the mens auctoris (as it was for Schleiermacher or Dilthey) either. We will abide by Gerdamer’s negation of hermeneutic capability to retrieve author’s original intention. Nevertheless, such an approach has certainly the advantage to make passible the most influent structures involved in cognitive processes.

Cognitive processes in general, and the relation between memory and conscience in the specific, have been extensively investigated. Similarly, the historicality of the hermeneutic as the constitutive dimension of the human thought has been the object of inquiry of a long tradition possibly founded by Heidegger. Particularly interesting for our research is Hans-Georg Gadamer’s development of Heidegger’s hermeneutic; he demonstrated the primacy of the historical-linguistic dimension over every other form of knowledge. Remarkable, in Gadamer’s speculations, is the critic of every attempt to adopt natural sciences’ study models in human sciences and the attention for the intersubjective nature of the Meaning. Gadamer’s proposal for the adoption of a hermeneutical approach to the study of human science has, however, rarely been put into practice. Referring specifically to historiography, to enquire into national narrative construction has often meant to conduct critical discourse analysis or philological investigations of texts. Consequently, the dialogical dimension of the Thought, as part of an individual hermeneutical circle, received little consideration.

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14 See, as an example, Donald Rice and Peter Schofer, Rhetorical poetics: theory and practice of figural and symbolic reading in modern French literature (Madison: the University of Wisconsin press, 1983).
16 Ibid. 95.
In other words, national narratives are often investigated as historical, “cultural”, social, or even political events, but rarely as intellectual ones.

This is the case of most studies about Lithuanian historiography or, more precisely, on the historiography of Lithuanians’ history. It is precisely in the expression “Lithuanians’ history” (lietuvių istorija) which is sometimes preferred to “history of Lithuania” (Lietuvos istorija) that the socio-political perspective of Lithuanian historians’ studies manifests itself. Even before Adolfas Šapoka urged to ‘find the Lithuanians in the history of Lithuania’, the investigation of Lithuanian historiography was shaped by both a strictly political framing, and the question of the national identity. Additionally, it should be noted that defining the identity, in the Lithuanian historiography, has been often intended as reacting to ‘all German, Russian, and Polish trash’ in order to develop a ‘really Lithuanian history’.

It was probably the will to react to the great success of this approach to the study of the national past – a methodologically erroneous approach which defines the aim before the formulation of the historical problem – that induced Alfredas Bumblauskas to coin the term “baltophilia”, develop a new periodization of Lithuanian history and implement a new method to investigate Lithuanian historiography. Nonetheless, his inquires, while based on a ‘poly-paradigmatic’ approach, are still limited to two methods of investigation: the philological text analysis and the socio-political contextualization of the authors and their works. Little attention is given to texts as cognitive and communicative acts.

On the contrary, evident in the works of Egidijus Aleksandravičius and Antanas Kulakauskas is the interest for the historiography as a form of narrative. In their works narrative is always a communicative act determined by the historical,

19 Ibid. 15.
20 We have already dealt with the historical reasons for the Lithuanian historiography being mainly a political historiography in our handbook, History of Lithuanian historiography (Vilnius: Akteja, 2013). However, the idea that every historical work defined by the image of a state is, precisely, a political history had been more authoritatively uttered by Benedetto Croce referring to the history of Italy. ‘Before the 1860 [...] there is no history of Italy. […] The reference is to the political history [...] since “Italy” (as “France”, “England”, “Germany” and so on), when not intended as an extrinsic geographical delimitation, is a political concept and nothing else can be.’ Benedetto Croce, ‘Recenti controversie intorno all’unità della storia d’Italia’, in La storia come pensiero e come azione (Bari: Laterza, 1978): 303-14, 305.
24 Egidijus Aleksandravičius, and Antanas Kulakauskas, Nuo amžių slenksčio: naujausia Lietuvos XIX amžius
epistemological, and political context. Accordingly, historians are always presented and studied as beings-in-time or, more precisely, as identities-in-time. This is evident, as an example, in the study about the identity of Adam Mickiewicz in the Lithuanians’ historiography,\(^\text{25}\) which, anyway, is still framed in a research on political historiography.

Nonetheless, the cognitive-communicative act which constitutes the central element of history-writing is also, and firstly, a personal and individual hermeneutical practice. The author and his *in fieri* oeuvre are always actively interconnected by a communicative act occurring between conscience and memory. These processes of the mind are influencing historians much more than the historical or social context; before being beings-in-time, historians are beings-in-thought. The cognitive processes involved in the formulation of the memory deserve a detailed analysis. However, as far as we know, the hermeneutical investigation of the Lithuanian historiography has never been carried out. However, in many cases, it might reveal the elements that define the prejudice (intended as *Vorverständnis*) shaping historians’ representation of reality.\(^\text{26}\) Whoever is attempting an investigation into intellectual practices should be aware of the impact of these fore-meanings and the history of historiography makes no exception.

1. COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND HISTORY-WRITING

As we mentioned in this article’s introduction, we understand narrative in general as a linguistic construction. This process of linguistic construction starts with a noetic act, which is subsequently rationally formulated, memorized and, eventually, communicated. This is roughly the scheme defined by Bergson in order to represent the movement of the mind from perception to action passing through memory.

Even if it is not our intention to inquire into the relation between reality, its perception by the human intellect, and memory as the French philosopher did in his notorious *Matter and Memory*, we certainly have to build on a representation of the translation process which transforms an act of the conscience into a linguistic message such as a written historical work. In order to achieve this goal, we will make use of Bergson’s representation of the relation between perception


\(^{26}\) For the concept of prejudice see Gadamer, ‘The hermeneutic circle and the problem of prejudice’ in *Truth and Method*, 235-44.
and memory, readapting his cone (which has been reproduced in figure 1). The most interesting aspects of Bergson’s investigation are the definition of the role and functioning of memory, and the description of a continuous movement in our conscience from perception to memory. Referring to memory he distinguishes pure memory, memory-image, and perception, which are always in relation never being the perception a mere contact of the mind with the object present; it is impregnated with memory-images which complete it as they interpret it.27 In other words, these images are something we already consciously possess and use to “understand” new perception comparing (or framing) the latter with (or in) the former.

For the purposes of our research, even more important is the understanding of Bergson’s definition of ‘continuous movement’ and the concept of ‘selection’ – the behaviours of the mind that mainly impact the metaphorical representation of the past in written texts.28 With the expression ‘continuous movement’ Bergson refers to the concept that the general idea is always in movement between the plane of action (S in figure 1) and that of pure memory (AB in the same figure). The “general idea” oscillates continually between the summit S and the base AB. However, it is only in S that it takes the clearly defined form of a bodily attitude or that of an uttered word. Correspondingly, the word (a text) is the crystalized result of this movement in a given moment.

Bergson definition of ‘selection’ is concise enough to be directly quoted here:

The body, always oriented toward the action, has the essential function to limit, for the sake of action, the life of the spirit. It [the body] is a selection tool [...] Shall we consider memory? The function of the body is not to store recollections, but simply to choose [...] the useful one. [...] This [...] selection [...] is less rigorous since it is based on an individual experience [...] fantasy is therefore granted a certain freedom.29

Clearly Bergson is referring to ‘fantasy’ in the very specific sense of the schemes (like time, space, meanings, recollections) that the intellect uses, to a certain extent arbitrarily, to frame and shape the perception. In this sense it tends to correspond with the idea of Vorverständnis (prejudices) defined by Gadamer as natural and unavoidable pre-comprehensions of the perceptions.

Specifically, Gadamer understands prejudice as the natural tendency of the Thought, which, trying to intentionally know something, tends to attribute to the being known preconceived meanings. This personal attribution of meaning (Weltansicht) constitutes a fundamental part of the cognitive processes since every

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27 Bergson, Materia e memoria, 142.
28 Ibid. 148-51.
29 Ibid. 152.
perception is knowingly acquired by our conscience only once it has been framed in pre-existent knowledge.\(^{30}\) According to Gadamer (as it is for Bergson), to know is a process of continuous interaction with already possessed framing structures and memory. Clearly, both Bergson and Gadamer are stressing the fact that our ‘conscience is historically effected’.\(^{31}\)

This idea is not new since it was encompassed in Heidegger’s formulation of ‘fore-project’ and ‘fore-meanings’. It was openly expounded by Gadamer reinterpreting Heidegger’s hermeneutical circle in order to make practical use of it.

In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.\(^{32}\)

As noted by Gadamer, ‘the point of Heidegger’s hermeneutical thinking is not so much to prove that there is a circle as to show that this circle possesses an ontologically positive significance’.\(^{33}\) Every study on whatever manifestation of an activity of the mind should take into account the influence and manifestation of these ‘imperceptible habits of thought’,\(^{34}\) and consider them (in both the author and the reader) an object of investigation as relevant as the subject matter itself.

What we can add to these considerations is that, from the perspective of history-writing, it is undeniable these habits or structures pass into the manifest sign, that is in the written or uttered expressions of this hermeneutical circle. Readapting Thomas S. Eliot’s words, one could state that the historians are often looking for the impersonality of their studies and written works, but precisely because they consider themselves as a medium rather than a personality, they produce signs (texts) deformed according to the mechanisms of interpretation the medium itself is using. Therefore, written historical texts are always the result of a translation process executed by a medium (the historians’ mind) ‘in which impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways.’\(^{35}\) Hence, referring specifically to national narratives, not only this means that every attempt to formulate or communicate an understanding of the past is effected by a series of prejudices,

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\(^{31}\) Ibid.


\(^{33}\) Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 236.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

which are both shaping (because included in) the texts and educating the readers to adopt the same prejudices when trying to frame individual “perceptions of the reality”.\textsuperscript{36} It also means that, trying to define the peculiarities of a certain historiographical tradition, these habits of the thought (framing structures) must be investigated together with the subject matter because equally relevant.

Enquiring into historiography intended as a manifestation of the conscience, we should make use of the awareness of these cognitive processes. Firstly, we can provide a rough representation of the process of translation of the historians’ understanding into a text, and then we can investigate Lithuanian historiography trying to individuate these schemes and describe how they influence and shape the communicated information.

As proposed by Bergson, the construction of a (historical) thought is a process starting with the perception of the reality and concluding with an intelligible symbol that could be the “action” or a text. Following the French philosopher, we could explain and detail this representation like this: the human intellect is both intuitive and not limited to its \textit{a priori} forms. Therefore, it is capable to perceive all the dynamic aspects of the reality. However, since the real is infinite and non-discrete, the human conscience cannot reproduce the reality: it is merely able to represent it. The result of this representation process is what we can define ‘non formulated memory’,\textsuperscript{37} that is the image produced in our conscience which we cannot transmit to other persons because it is still a continuous form of knowledge. If we want to store or transfer this newly acquired knowledge, we should formulate it in a rational manner, that is, we have to translate it into language. It is only after we have rationally formulated our perception that we can reproduce it in a text or speech. Clearly memory itself is not a pure image of the reality: it is the result of a process of interaction between new and old information. The latter, sometimes, is used as framing structure to collocate and label the former.

A number of studies suggest that the most important pre-formed structures are space and time. This concept is self-evident and has been given sufficient consideration by philosopher and historians alike.\textsuperscript{38} We can note that even in the void that surrounds Descartes’ \textit{cogito ergo sum} the present tense of the verbs reveals the subject self-collocation in time: I am \textit{now}. Defining cognitive processes in relation with history-writing it is necessary to be aware of scholars’ distinction between

\textsuperscript{36} Cf. Bergson, \textit{Materia e memoria}, 65-66.

\textsuperscript{37} ibid. 65.

\textsuperscript{38} We are referring to Heidegger’s \textit{Being and Time}. Cf. Stephen Mulhall, ‘Heidegger’s (Re)visionary Moment: Time as the Human Horizon’, in \textit{Heidegger and Being an Time} (London and New York: Routledge, 2005): 152-80.
experienced and historical time. Since the mind, as mentioned above, cannot reproduce the experience, the historical time can be only a metaphor of the experienced time. And it is precisely this already formulated representation of time that is supposedly used as a prejudice to construe historical narratives. The time of the historians is an abstract, uniform, and invisible, but intellectually formulated, structure necessary to “collocate” each new piece of information.

It is evident that drawing this scheme we have traced the perspective of study of cognitive rhetoric. According to specialists of this field, such as Peter Schofer and Donald Rice, the rhetorical construction of every text is nothing more than a process of translation. Notably, it is a translation process that perfectly matches the stages defined above in the reformulation of Bergson’s cone. According to Schofer and Rice, rhetoric is intended as the act of translation between two systems of representation of the world that is, between conscience and language. This translation is, for the nature of the systems themselves, indefinite and vague: the conscience is a continuous form of knowledge while the language is a discrete one. By consequence, the language can give only a partial representation of the conscience. Nevertheless, this irregular translation is the essence of every creative thought. Therefore, rhetoric is intended as generation precisely because it tries to create irregular semantic oppositions capable of the expression of knowledge that transcends the limits of the language. Thus, a trope is the essence of the creative though – the capability to reproduce the system of the conscience by the means of a language which encompass an irrational (super-sensible) component too.

The coincidence between cognitive processes centred on memory (and language) and the practice of rhetorical construction is not surprising. We have opened this article claiming every form of narrative is a linguistic construction. Now we can safely add that every linguistic expression is a rhetorical construction. It is a rhetorical construction at least according to this more precise understanding of rhetoric – a means of translation.

We believe that a correct analysis of the rhetorical construction of every form of narrative, intended as a communicative act, could make evident some of these framing structures or prejudices and, referring specifically to historiography, explain how they interact with memory in the historians’ practice. We can achieve this starting from the crystalized result of the whole cognitive process – moving from the hermeneutical investigation of the texts.

39 The debate is summarized in Jonutytė, Philosophy of history, 13-14.
41 Ibid. 332. Cf. Jonutytė, Philosophy of history, 14.
42 See Rice, Rhetorical poetics.
The idea to understand the study of the symbols as a manifestation of the processes occurring in the conscience is not new. Possibly it is the general aim of the hermeneutic. It was Paul Ricoeur to convincingly demonstrate the possibility to determine the historicality of the changing and subjective cognitive processes investigating the sign.\(^{43}\) Referring to history-writing, we believe that if framing structures are necessary to formulate a representation of the reality (and from it a message, a “story”, or a “narrative”), then it is possible that these personal understandings of the framing structures are silently transmitted, reproduced, or included in the manifest linguistic expression especially in order to educate the readers to use them.

Even if not openly, and in a certain way “silently”, scholars are narrating, silently, but consciously, to educate to perceive the world or to frame memory in an oriented manner. This primarily means that scholars are usually transmitting (or teaching to use) specific categories and definitions of space and time.

Summing up the argument, we have established that:

a. Every perception of the reality is always translated into memory and successively into expression by the means of a selection and framing process aimed at action and continuously interacting with memory.

b. Selection and framing result from the continuous movement of the intellect between already acquired framing structures (in the form of memory, prejudices, Vorverstänndnis, or fore-conceptions) and the present.

c. Historiography – the communicative performance, which linguistically formulates the translation of every noetic act into knowledge aiming at educating or narrating – is one of the manifestations of the cognitive process and as such should be investigated.

e. It is possible that the framing structures adopted by one’s mind are preserved, in order to be divulged, illustrated and taught, in the linguistic structures which encompass super-sensible elements, that is, in the “silences” that constitute the essence of the rhetorical construction of a texts. These “silences” are particularly meaningful in (rhetorical) tropes.

2. TIME FRAMING SPACE IN POST-SOVIET LITHUANIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

With respect to a silent manner of teaching, one should note that, sometimes, silence is imposed by contingent circumstances. This is the case when a state censorship is in place. However, it seems that this kind of censures, being evident, enhance authors’ awareness of the necessity to transmit the hidden meanings. This

concept has been clearly expressed by Raimonds Briedis when referring to the Baltic States:

The censor, who is expected to understand only the direct meaning of words, becomes a third creative partner in the communicative relationship between the author and the reader. The author thus creates a text for two target audiences – the reader and the censor. The censor becomes an observer, while the text can often be metaphorically regarded as a background noise that has to break through hidden meanings.44

Correspondingly, there is a relevant difference between what was transmitted through silence when there was a censorship in place, and after the censorship had been abolished. During the Soviet period, silence was used in communicative acts mainly to pass meanings. As remarked by Anneli Mihkelev:

One of the important techniques in the poetic language of this period [Soviet] was the use of multiple pauses. Poets spoke [...] through silence. [...] During Soviet times authors filled such pauses with social and political messages.45

We might add that not only poets were forced to communicate through silence, possibly every intellectual was, more or less, adopting such a strategy.

On the contrary, since nowadays it is usually not necessary to hide or mask the messages anymore, meaningful pauses and silence are used when one intends ‘to reproduce the system of the conscience in a linguistic expression that encompass a non-informative, but “educative” (super-sensible) component’ – supposedly the above-mentioned framing structures and, referring specifically to historiography, conceptions of space and time.46 The debate about the understanding of time was topical during the first half of the 20th century, but, apparently, is not so relevant anymore. Nonetheless, scholars are still silently defining historical time, especially in connection to certain political concepts. This is evident in the implicit, and occasionally unspoken, descriptions of the chronological limits of phenomena and researches.

As an example, we could consider the title proposed for a conference to be organized by VMU researchers and titled ‘History and Present of the Female Monkhood in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania’. The analysis of the rhetorical construction of this title is utterly revealing. The figure of speech known as zeugma (where a single word is used in relation to two other parts of a sentence although the word


grammatically or logically pertains to only one) has been used (quite probably unconsciously). Connecting the terms “history” and “present” with a legal-political entity which does not exist anymore (the GDL) is a zeugma in the sense that “the Grand Duchy of Lithuania” is used in connection with two terms of which only one – “history” – is logically connected with it, while “present” requires the reader to actively fill in the missing connection. Forcing the reader to make this intellectual effort induces him/her (consciously or not) firstly to think of time as a continuous progress of related events and existences. Secondly, basing on this particular conception of time, continuity and unity are conferred to legal-political entities despite the fact that these entities, from political, territorial, “cultural”, or legislative perspectives, are discontinuous. In other words, the reader is taught to adopt a preformulated definition of time when reflecting on the relation between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the contemporary Republic of Lithuania. In turn, it seems clear that the authors were themselves educated to adopt this attitude, which is now operating as a prejudice when investigating or describing the relation between the GDL and the contemporary Lithuanian Republic – two political entities.

The idea of unity and continuity in the history of an ‘imagined community’ is a problem that, sooner or later, every historians’ body is forced to face. Unity is intended by the backers of this idea as a sort of continuity in the history of contemporary political entity. It is a unity that connects the contemporary entity to a variety of other political, ethnic, administrative, or cultural entities in the past, forming a sort of historical path which gives reason and justifies the present-day situation. In several countries (such as in France, Italy, or Spain), the supporters of the idea of continuity justified (and in certain cases still defend) the unity of the national history by grounding their historical analyses on the geographical definition of the political object. Italy, as an example, was a term always openly referring exclusively to the Italian Peninsula in the prefaces of the works, which, consequently, were allowed to trace the history back to the prehistoric times. However, in the bodies of these histories of Italy, the term Italy was equated to the modern Italian Kingdom or Italian Republic and, consequently, the ancient history of the Italian Peninsula was arbitrarily transformed in the history or, rather, vorgeschichte.

47 This conception is neither the only one possible, nor is commonly accepted by scholars. Cf. Danutė Bacevičiūtė, _Laiko sampratos transformacija šiuolaikinėje filosofijoje: E. Husserlis ir E. Levinas_. Doctoral thesis defended at Vytautas Magnus University (Vilnius: VDU, 2005).


50 See, as an example, Agostino Colpio, _La storia d’Italia_ (Firenze: Adriano Saliani Editore, s. d.).
of the contemporary political entity.\footnote{Croce, \textit{La storia}, 305.} In other words, the perception of space as a geographical unitary frame permitted to create unity in historical time too.

On the contrary, in the historiography of most Eastern European countries, rarely the geographical space (the territory) is used to frame political histories. Rather, the continuity of time is adopted as a framing structure for the representation of a cultural, historical, ethnic, or political space. Manifestly, in this region, the idea of territory as a geographic concept can neither be easily applied to trace clear-cut borders for imagined communities, nor become a handy framing structure to formulate continuity in political histories. Equally manifest, however, is that if it is possible to individuate (in the greatly uniform traits of humanity) culturally, economically, ethnically, and linguistically\footnote{The theory that geographical isolation influences the development and differentiation of languages is commonly accepted. Cf. Guido Barbina, \textit{Geografia delle lingue: lingue, etnie e nazioni nel mondo contemporaneo}, (Roma: Carocci, 2005).} distinct communities it is primarily because of the influence of the morphological configuration of the territory (especially of mountains or deserts),\footnote{It was Massimo Firpo, Professor at Turin University who firstly made us aware of the influence of the morphological configuration of the territory in defining intellectual and material life similitudes and dissimilarities stating that there are many more common traits between the communities inhabiting the two opposite slopes of a mountain than between those living on the summit and in the valley floor of the mountain even if the two slopes belong to two different countries or historically distinct regions. Similarly, much more relevant seems to be the opposition city vs. non-city in defining cultural, economical, and intellectual borders: there are many more similitudes between the life in two cities in different countries, than between city and countryside in the same state. For the connection city = civilization see Lellia Cracco Ruggini, ‘La città imperiale’, in \textit{Storia di Roma}, vol. 4 (Torino: UTET, 1989): 201-66. Cf. the consideration about the persistence in time of the binomial city-civilization in Valerio Neri, \textit{I marginali nell’occidente tardoantico} (Bari: Laterza, 1998): 143-51.} or because of the impact of climate.\footnote{The interdependence between climate and civilization has been theorized in ancient times, but, in certain respects, it is still considered a sound theory. See, as an example, the theoretical comments in Maria A. Giua, \textit{Contesti ambientali e azione umana nella storiografia di Tacito}, (Como: New press, 1988), 37. Illustrative and fundamental comments on the relation between climate and history can be found in Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, ‘Storia e clima’, in Fernand Braudel (ed.), \textit{Problemi di metodo storico} (Bari: Laterza, 1973): 140-82. See also Edmund Schulman, ‘Tree ring and History in the Western United States, \textit{Smithsonian Report for 1955} (1956): 459-73.} In the Lithuanian historiography, there have been attempts to adopt rivers and, especially, forests to define the limits of “cultural-political” Lithuania,\footnote{Algirdas Brukas et al. (eds.), \textit{Radviliškio krašto miškai: Aukštaitijos, Žemaitijos ir Žiemgalos sandūros miškų istorija, ūkininkavimas, gamtinės ir socialinės vertybės}, (Kaunas: Adakisa, 2007). Cf. Lina Snitkienė, Romualdas Barauskas (eds.), \textit{Lietuvos valstybiniai miškai. Gamtai ir žmonėms} (Kaunas: Lututė, 2006).} however, the danger to define an ‘incomplete community’ was immediately perceived and this perspective abandoned. The temporal
definition of space is certainly more effective in construing political identities where natural elements are not significant.\(^{56}\)

To illustrate, rhetorically, the label “the Baltic States” is a synecdoche: it refers to three of the Baltic States by using an expression that should refer to all states located on the shores of the Baltic Sea. It identifies a part with the totality. Evidently, this silent and almost commonly accepted synecdoche is disseminating a political or, using a very fashionable modern terminology, a geo-political definition of space. Moreover, this expression includes and transmits a perception of time. The term “Baltic” has assumed a variety of meanings, but rarely had a purely geographical one being usually a political-linguistic-ethnic expression.\(^{57}\) Notably, until World War One, it did not include the area occupied by modern days Lithuania, or that of the GDL or part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, or the Lithuanian Governorates.\(^{58}\) For example, Edward C. Thaden uses the term “Baltic” to refer specifically to Estonia, Livonia, Curonia (Courland), and Finland. Finland was a “Baltic State” until 1918.\(^{59}\) Nonetheless, nowadays historians tend to use the labels “Baltic States” or “Baltic Countries” even when referring to the history of Lithuania, but rarely in connection to the history of Finland.\(^{60}\) Despite the fact that “Baltic States” is a label introduced to refer to the four countries on the shores of the Baltic Sea which gained independence from the Russian Empire in the wake of World War I, the history of the Baltic States is usually connected under this label even narrating about the remote past of these countries, as if to say that the present-days common traits are the result of a common path toward the formation of contemporary politically independent countries. Time is silently presented as a continuous path not defined by its origins, but rather by the present situation. In contemporary Lithuanian historiography, as will be shown, the concept of national history is clearly framed by this idea. This cognitive process is especially visible in the formulation of national histories by such metaphors as the “roots”, the “origins” or the “path” of a nation.


\(^{59}\) See George Maude, Aspects of the Governing of the Finns (New-York: Peter Lang, 2010).

\(^{60}\) See, as an example, Endre Bojtár, Foreword to the Past: A Cultural History of the Baltic People (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 1999).
To illustrate this assumption, Tomas Baranauskas’ study on *The Origins of the Lithuanian State* can be investigated. The title of this work would certainly strike the attention of a scholar following Croce’s tradition, and, even more, a disciple of Bloch and the *École des Annales*. Whether Baranauskas has ‘fallen pray of the demons of the origins’ or not, it is interesting to compare this monographic work with a series of contributes he wrote for the journal *Voruta* on *The Origins of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania*, and to relate them with his 1995 article *When was Lithuania Unified?* The fluctuations from “the Grand Duchy of Lithuania”, to “the Lithuanian State”, passing through “Lithuania” to label researches investigating the same subject reveal hidden cognitive acts and encourage certain considerations.

Firstly, “Lithuania” is a remarkably polysemic term. In the mentioned works and in the majority of other historical research, the term is used to refer to the prehistoric times, to the first Lithuanian state, to the period from 1795 to 1918, to the first Lithuanian Republic, to the Soviet Lithuanian Republic, or to the Second Lithuanian Republic. It is also polysemic because, nowadays, it is employed to refer, at the same time, to a state (the Lithuanian State whatever it is or was), a territory (belonging to Lithuania), and, interestingly, to the Lithuanians. Representative in this sense is the use of “land of Lithuanians”, “Lithuanians”, and “Lithuania” approximately as synonyms when rendering ancient texts. Demonstrative are also the 20th century reprints of Simonas Daukantas’ *The Habits of the Ancient Lithuanians, Highlanders and Samogitians*, which usually carry the cover title *The Habits of Lithuanians*. The unity of three identities, which the author considered in certain respects distinct, is construed on the polysemy of the linguistic expression used

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62 We are referring to “the theory of the water buckets” expressed by Croce: it is misleading to believe a certain historical situation has a beginning and an end from which another historical time originates. Similarly, it is dangerous to define distinct periods in history assuming one is the result and substitute for the previous (stating, as an example, that at the end of the Middle Ages a Humanist period started). See, Benedetto Croce, *Teoria e storia della storiografia* (Bari: Laterza, 1920): 183-204.
63 ‘In the current vocabulary, the origins are an explicative beginning. Even worse: a beginning that is enough to explain. There is the ambiguity. Here the danger.’ Marc Bloch, *Apologie pour l’histoire ou métier d’historien* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1949): 6.
to refer to it. Ethnic, political, linguistic, and territorial meanings mingle and fade under the label Lithuania(ns) in political histories.

Secondly, if one is searching for the origins of something, he is certainly “staring” at the past from the present. It is the present situation to shape and somehow guide the intentions of our stare toward the past. In other words, it is the existence of a modern Lithuanian state to invite scholars to search for the origins of a Lithuanian state. Evident is the incapability to perceive time as something separated from the present and, even more unmistakeably, the continuity of time is defined by the present, not by the past.

Finally, in the Lithuanian historiography, as soon as historians abandon local (regional or urban) historical researches to focus on the national history, the framing structure of space assumes a non-geographical connotation. The question “where?” is always evident in every study. Nevertheless, when writing the national history, the answer is almost always a political concept. Geographical elements do not influence the perception and representation of the national history; space is always a diachronic construction of a political, ethnical, social, or “cultural” reality.71 There are no strict geographical definitions of Lithuania in the contemporary historiography about the origins of the Lithuanian state.72 This kind of construction permits to reproduce linguistically the understanding of time as a continuous flow and build on it a continuous representation of national history. The identification of constructed time and historical time induce to think of the “creation and development” of a nation as a diachronic process that is necessarily continuous and united as the structure that defines it.

After Daukantas, the geographical indications to refer to the country have been rarely used in the Lithuanian historiography. Usually, cultural, linguistic, political, and legal frames are adopted. Conversely, the concept of territory is often used referring to regional or local entities. The idea that the territory is not a geographical space is transmitted to the reader especially in connection with national history and without a linguistic translation of this concept. The formulation of the project from which this article originates can be used as an example: ‘Central and Eastern European Region: Research of the Construction of National Narratives and Politics of Memory (1989-2011)’. Central and Eastern Europe are the territories defined by the chronological limits of the research and, thus, intended as the part

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72 The disputable search for the origins is not typical exclusively of Baranauskas’ researches, on the contrary it is very common in contemporary Lithuanian historiography. As an example, see Algirdas Girininkas, Baltų kultūros ištakos (Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 1998). In these texts, territory is a cultural rather than geographical space.
of Europe which was previously in (or influenced by) the Soviet-communist area. The notion that Central and Eastern Europe is not a geographic territory but rather a historical “spaces” is strongly affirmed with silence.

The possibility to transmit these concepts without even mentioning the term territory is possible with the help of rhetorical ellipsis (and synecdoche as a sub-category of ellipsis). Ellipsis is used in history-writing as a figure of speech playing on the mechanism of polyvalence of the linguistic symbol. Representative of this concept is Mintautas Čiurinskas’ research about the genre of biography in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In the introduction, the author openly recognizes that

It is not possible to take a rigid criterion to decide what to call the GDL’s texts, such as the nationality or ethnicity of the authors. […] The collected materials […] are called Lithuanian in the broader sense – it is what is related with the cultural space of the GDL.73

The territorial definition of Lithuanian is not only refused, but even annulled by the figure of speech of ellipsis; space has no cultural meaning or culture, therefore a ‘cultural space’ is a linguistic construction of an intellectual representation of space. It is pure language in which, to use de Saussure’s terminology, the relation between the signifier and the signified is very weak. In other words, the linguistic expression is not referring to a signified through meaning, but rather is referring to meaning through meaning. Apparently, what we have called framing structures, in this case, are not used to translate perception, rather they are used to present a concept already stored in the memory-image. The line representing the continuous movement of the idea (as described in the first section) is reduced to a segment connecting the words to the already linguistically formulated memory excluding the reference to reality. The formulation of a historical problem is reduced to pure language in which the polysemy of a political label is the decisive factor in the formulation of the problem. We are in front of a linguistic rendition of a linguistic concept. However, if

Everything is in language, then language itself is nothing, that is, it is separable from reality. But if language was not different from what it talks about, it would not communicate, not even signify. The presentation of the text as a self-sufficient monadic entity also contradicts the basic rule of communication theory: meaning is only achieved by difference.74


While this Emig Rainer’s consideration was formulated referring to modernist poets, we could easily reinterpret it to express a concern about contemporary trends in historiography. The comment of Izolda G. Geniušienė (from which this passage has been quoted) could be applied to the Lithuanian historiography: the scholar claims that modern authors exploit a very ambiguous relation between the signifier and the signified making it even more ambiguous or reducing it to the relation ‘between several signifiers, with no reality left to refer to’.75

3. LANGUAGE FRAMING SPACE AND TIME: ABOUT ALGIANTAS BUČYS’ “OLDER THAN THE OLDEST” LITHUANIAN LITERATURE

In this article’s theoretical premise, we assumed that time and space are two most important framing structures in history-writing cognitive process. In the second section, referring to the Lithuanian historiography about the national history, we had to revise the assumption by noting that space is certainly not a framing structure. It is rather a concept selected and defined by the conception of time. Finally, we observed that the possibility to frame space in time (and thus construe the unity of national history) is attained by exploiting the polysemy of certain expressions and figures of speech. An emblematic illustration of this hierarchy in cognitive processes and its use in historiography is offered by Algimantas Bučys’ book Seniausioji lietuvių literatūra. Mindaugo epocha: poliparadigminė viduramžių kultūrinių konfliktų studija.76

This is a striking title especially because the subject matter of the book would have been perfectly described by a heading such as ‘A Study about Three 13th Century Sacral Texts’.77 Reading the chosen provocative title, several questions arise: why has the author renounced the unambiguous “sacral” to opt for the polysemic and non-technical term “Lithuanians”? Why has he decided to substitute the undisputable “13th Century” with “the epoch of Mindaugas”? What is a “cultural” conflict?

Intentionally provocative is the author’s decision to opt for “the oldest” (seniausioji), intended as “older than the oldest”, rather than just “ancient” (senoji) referring to literature. Furthermore, this terminological choice is misleading since it is not referring to newly discovered texts that would licitly allow moving back “the origins” of the Lithuanian literature. In the book, the already known texts are investigated. They were simply never included in the Lithuanian literature because

75 Izolda G. Geniušienė, Our Concern, 63.
76 See note 71.
77 Bučys himself uses this expression to label the whole research, but in a place certainly much less visible than the title. Bučys, Seniausioji lietuvių literatūra, 17.
of the place and land where they were written, the language used, their manuscript tradition, and the facts narrated.

Moreover, the author provocatively decided not to collocate these texts in the history of Lithuanian (Lietuvis) literature, but rather in the history of the literature of the Lithuanians (Lietuvių). The reason for renouncing the unambiguous “sacral” to opt for “the Lithuanians” could be easily explained reminding the reader that Bučys’ book was printed in the occasion of the thousandth anniversary since the first mentioning of the name “Lithuania”. There is, however, another reason behind this choice: the term “the Lithuanians” can immediately – and silently – be connected with “Lithuania” creating that linguistic ambiguity on which unity and continuity are built in most national histories. It is obvious that Bučys does not intend just to communicate a piece of information (provide the readers with some new literary texts); he certainly aims at educating the readers to collocate these texts in a preconceived “conceptual frame” (what is Lithuanian, and since when one can speak of the Lithuanian culture).

The book is educating, first of all, to construe the national identity rethinking the concept of historical time in connection with national history. Time and identity are clearly the two focal points of Bučys’ educative programme. Speaking about time, and answering the second of our questions, revealing is the substitution of “13th Century” with “the epoch of Mindaugas”. Obviously, the first expression would have been connected with “literature” referring to a partition of it. On the contrary, “the epoch of Mindaugas” refers directly to “Lithuanians” and, consequently, to “Lithuania”. This terminological selection silently disseminates the idea that the ruler of a multi-ethnic state was indeed the Lithuanians’ king. Moreover, in this contexts, ambiguous is the term seniausioji that can now be connected to both “Lithuanians’ literature” and “Lithuanians’ history” (referring to the historical figure of Mindaugas who has little relevance in the history of literature) telling that there is also a “not so old” and consequently a modern period in Lithuania(ns)’history. The continuity of history is construed, together with the identity, on a linguistic expression.

That the final aim of the book is the reinforcement and expansion of national identity is self-evident in the correlation of the two unnecessary and non-informative terms seniausioji and Lietuvių speaking about the meaningless lable “culture”. The whole book is a study on a possible reformulation of the expression “Lithuanians’

78 We could confront this linguistic ambiguity – and its exploitation to create “unity” – with the specular Estonian case. ‘Ethnic and civic conceptions of nations cannot be clearly separated from each other. […] In the Estonian discourses, this connection is inscribed in the distinction between “rahvas” (ethnic group […]) and “rahvus” (nation). However, this distinction becomes often a handy identification in national history. Jörg Hackmann, ‘Narrating the Building of a Small Nation: Divergence and Convergence in the Historiography of Estonian “National Awakening”, 1868–2005’, in Stefan Berger, and Chris Lorenz (eds.), Nationalizing the Past Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010): 170-191, 171.
culture”. This is manifest in the terminology used in the Age-of-Enlightenment-style comment on the shrinking of the darkness of the unknown.\textsuperscript{79} Firstly, the author tells he has not discovered (\textit{surasti}) new texts, but rather he has included (\textit{įtraukti}) new texts in the literature of the Lithuanians.\textsuperscript{80} In other words, the author’s aim was to define Lithuanian culture in a way that could allow him to include new texts in Lithuanian culture. Secondly, to include these texts, the author categorically denies the territorial framework used in the past by scholars as Albinas Jovaišas.\textsuperscript{81} Similarly, and with good reasons, refused is the ethnical parameter (in the past so important for Šapoka).\textsuperscript{82} Analogously, and rightfully, he claims unviable is the definition of an administrative criterion to frame Lithuanians’ literature. However, very unusual, and therefore illuminating, is Bučys’s decision to refuse the linguistic parameter too.\textsuperscript{83} This linguistic parameter is typically the main (and often the only) one adopted to define other literatures (the terms French, Italian, English, Latin in literature always refer to the language of the texts). It is precisely because this technical, concrete, and almost everywhere accepted parameter does not allow including the selected texts in the literature of the Lithuanians that it has been refused. Rather, a “cultural parameter” defined by the preconceived aim of the study is used. The cost to achieve this result is the adoption of a poly-paradigmatic approach that is ‘difficult’, ‘requiring many efforts’ and almost thirty pages of explanation.\textsuperscript{84} It is a linguistic construction stating that “everything culturally Lithuanian should be included in the Lithuanians’ literature and that it was necessary to adopt a new study paradigm to define Lithuanians’ culture in a manner that permits these texts to be included in it”.\textsuperscript{85}

The reason for such an effort is openly revealed by Bučys himself. The analysed texts do not require a particular method of investigation because of their intrinsic characteristics. Rather, it is because the author’s ambition is to include new texts into the history of Lithuanians’ literature despite having been written not in the Lithuanian language, by persons ‘not living in the territories ruled by the Lithuanian dukes’,\textsuperscript{86} and occasionally being referred in the texts themselves as ‘Polish’\textsuperscript{87} ‘The aim’

\textsuperscript{79} ibid. 10.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} Bučys, \textit{Seniausioji lietuvių literatūra}, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. 9-35.
\textsuperscript{85} Expressions as “kultūrinis požiūris” and “kultūros įvykis” are scattered across the whole book. Cf. Ibid. 12. However, what does culture mean if not the arbitrary selection and decision of what is culture? Culture is not an attribute, but a linguistic definition. See Francesco Remotti, \textit{Control’identità} (Roma: Laterza, 1997).
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid. 18.
of the research is Bučys’ will ‘to include in the history of the literature of the Lithuanians texts which were never included […] before’. In passing, it should be noted how revealing is the choice of the term “Lithuanians” when juxtaposed to Adolfoš Šapoka’s call to ‘find the Lithuanians in the history of Lithuania’.

Furthermore, the timeline on which the history of literature is construed is expanded in this manner reaching the 13th century. Basing on this relation between time and literature, the cultural history of the Lithuanians is construed as united and continuous. Consequently, adopting a “cultural paradigm”, the author plays on the redefinition of linguistic formulation of the problem by transforming Lithuania into Lithuanians and connecting them with the historical figure of Mindaugas in order to extend, at the same time, the chronology of the national history. Furthermore, the geographical limits of Lithuania’s cultural borders have been consistently expanded thanks to this linguistic expedient.

This kind of logical expedient played on a terminology misleadingly construed on similarity is known as fallacy; the logical formulation of the reasoning is correct, but it results in an invalid outcome (which is not necessarily false) because the outcome results from the definition of some elements external to the logical construction (in this case, the chosen terminology). In this particular case, the fallacy is a specific one. It is called equivocation – the illegitimate switching of the meaning of the term (“Lithuanian” and “Lithuanians” defining Lithuanian literature) during the reasoning.

A more detailed analysis of the whole premise of Bučys’ work makes evident that there are few concrete references to the texts investigated. Almost all the book is focusing on the linguistic construction of space and time in Lithuanians’ cultural history, making them united and continuous under the label “culture.” However, culture itself is a linguistic metaphor of the selection process occurred when removing or including elements to formulate the idea of culture.

Furthermore, one should note that on the same paralogism construed on a linguistic expedient is based, as mentioned above, Mintautas Čiurinskas’ research on Lithuanian biographistic. On a symilar exploitation of the linguistic polisemcy are based a number of contemporary studies on the cultural history of a nation.

88 Ibid. 11.
89 See note 79.
91 See note 73.
92 Vytautas Vanagas, Lietuvių rašytojų sąvadas (Vilnius: Lietuvos rašytojų sąjungos leidykla, 1996).
CONCLUSIONS

Summing up, and with specific reference to Lithuanian historiography, the analysis of a number of texts is showing that the theoretical representation of cognitive processes’ framing structures is a distorted image of the actual practice. Firstly, it is evident that space is not a framing structure itself when referring to nation or national aspects. Rather, space is a concept selected and defined by that of historical time.

In turn, historical time seems not to be a metaphor of the experienced time, but rather of the formulated memory’s diachronic elements. Sometimes, it is used to frame linguistically construed concepts as national history, ethnic groups activities, cultural aspects, and culture *tout court*. In other words, it seems the movement of the general idea (in the schematic representation provided above) should be reduced in extent including just “word” and “framing structures” which are used to express “formulated memory”. On the contrary, very weak is the contact with the “perceptions of reality”. This is evident when scholars renounce every ‘signifier’ directly connected to a ‘signified’ (terms referring to language, borders, geographical elements, administrative divisions, etc.) preferring already linguistically construed ‘meanings’ (nation, identity, culture, etc.), which are “two steps below” the perceptions in the cognitive cone. The relation with the referent is weakened.

The referent often even disappears making the linguistic constructions of the though the object itself of historical researches. This is particularly evident in national narratives and specifically in the narrative constructions of the unity in the national history. In this field, scholars tend to exclude the referents even from the definitions of framing structure such as space and time. The language of the historians appears to actually be separable from reality as suggested by Rainer. Consequently, the language of historiography is indeed becoming not different from what it talks about since, in it, the relation between signifier and signified is becoming the relation ‘between several signifiers, with no reality left to refer to.’

Language is informing and shaping historians’ perception. The language, therefore, should be considered the main and most evident *prejudice* operating and defining cognitive processes in historiography. We can just suppose there are two reasons for this revealing finding. Firstly, studies defined by such prejudices can exploit the polysemy of certain expressions and rhetorical constructions to fulfil contemporary Lithuanian historiography’s main task – to ‘search for Lithuanians in Lithuanians’ history’. This should probably be intended an attempt to construe a national identity as a reaction to other imposed identities. Consequently, Lithuanian national narrative should be considered as an example of academic post-traumatic construction of memory.93 This

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would explain the necessity to expand the chronological and spatial borders of the identity. 

Secondly, we suggest language is becoming the most influential prejudice and framing structure because it is so flexible that can be used as a surrogate of the territorial (geographical-morphological) prejudice. It seems the lack of relevant morphological elements in a region could influence the cognitive processes of the peoples leaving in those areas. It becomes extremely difficult to frame perceptions and formulate memory outside space especially if the ‘action’ toward which the thought is projected is the definitions of “borders” as in the decision of national identities. The relation between national narrative, morphology of the territory, and identity in Eastern Europe should be better investigated.

Moreno Bonda

VALSTYBĖS Istorijos vienybė šiuolaikinėje Lietuvos istoriografijoje: studija apie kognityvinius procesus

SANTRAUKA. Šiame straipsnyje autoriaus tyrinėja sąsajas tarp kalbos ir kognityvinų procesų šiuolaikinėje Lietuvos istoriografijoje. Straipsnyje bandoma išskirti prietarpą (vok. Vorverstän-
dnis), remiantis Gadamerio terminologija, ar įrėminimo struktūras (Heideggerio įvardytos vok. Vor-structure), veikianti kognityvinius procesus, kurie vyksta, kai noetinius aktus ir atsimini-

mus norima „išversti” į komunikacinius veiksnius.

Remdamiesi Bergsono nubraižyta schema, vaizduojančia ryšius tarp sąmonės, atminties ir veiksmo (šiuo konkrečiu atveju – istorijos rašymo), mes nagrinėjame, kaip konstruojama vienybė nacionalinėje istoriografijoje (kuri čia suprantama kaip tam tikras tęstinumas šiuolaikinio politinio įvaizdio istoriografijoje). Antroje straipsnio dalyje pristatoma įvairių istoriografinių darbų analizė, surašinti pagrindų pakoreguoti kai kurias teorines prielaidas. Nors daugelyje teorijų svarbiausiomis įrėminimo struktūromis laikomos laikas ir erdvė, tyrimas parodė, kad Lietuvos istoriografijoje erdvė nėra įrėminanti struktūra, o greičiau sąvoka, apibrėžiai ir pasirinkta laiko. Istorinis laikas savo ruožtu yra apibrėžtas ir pasirinktas jau įsisavintų ir lingvistiškai suformu-

lotų sąvokų. Tai aškiai matoma, kai mokslininkai atmeta kiekvieną „žymiklų”, tiesiogiai susisie-

jų su „žyminiu“ (žodžiais, apibūdinančiais kalbą, sienas, geografinius elementus, administra-

cinį skirstymą) ir verčiau renkasi jau lingvistiškai sukonstruotas „reikšmes“ (tauta, tapatybė, kultūra). Šiekiant apibrėžti erdvė laikė ir taip sukonstruoti nacionalinės istorijos vienybę, varto-

jami tam tikri kalbinių reiškiniai ir retorinės figūros, kurie yra linkę pašalinėti „žyminius“ net iš erdvės ir laiko sąvokų. Pateikiami išvada, kad kalba formuoja istorikų suvokimą ir jį įprasma. Taigi kalba turėtų būti laikoma pagrindiniu prietarpu, veikianti kognityvinius procesus istoriogra-

fiuje.

RAKTAŽODIAI: Lietuvos istoriografija, kognityviniai procesai, atmintis, istorinis laikas, retorinės figūros, hermeneutika, nacionalinė istorya.

94 An identity is always affirmed in opposition to others and thus has to conquer “spaces” that once belonged to the other identities. Remotti, Contro l’identità, 72. Cf. with the expansion of the cultural borders of the Lithuanians operated by Vytautas Vanagas, Lietuvių rašytojų sąvadai (Vilnius: Lietuvos rašytojų sąjungos leidykla, 1996).
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